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Abstract
We present a formal, mathematical model of argument structure and evaluation, taking seriously the procedural and dialogical
aspects of argumentation. The model applies proof standards to determine the acceptability of statements on an issue-by-issue basis.
The model uses different types of premises (ordinary premises, assumptions and exceptions) and information about the dialectical
status of statements (stated, questioned, accepted or rejected) to allow the burden of proof to be allocated to the proponent or the
respondent, as appropriate, for each premise separately. Our approach allows the burden of proof for a premise to be assigned to a
different party than the one who has the burden of proving the conclusion of the argument, and also to change the burden of proof
or applicable proof standard as the dialogue progresses from stage to stage. Useful for modeling legal dialogues, the burden of
production and burden of persuasion can be handled separately, with a different responsible party and applicable proof standard for
each. Carneades enables critical questions of argumentation schemes to be modeled as additional premises, using premise types to
capture the varying effect on the burden of proof of different kinds of questions.
© 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
This article presents a functional model of the evaluation of commonsense arguments, taking seriously the proce-
dural and dialogical aspects of argumentation. The model, called Carneades in honor of the Greek skeptic philosopher
who emphasized the importance of plausible reasoning [9, vol. 1, p. 33–34], applies proof standards [10] to determine
the acceptability of statements on an issue-by-issue basis. The model has been implemented using a functional pro-
gramming language. This system, also called Carneades, supports a range of argumentation tasks, including argument
reconstruction, evaluation and visualization.
Carneades is meant to overcome several limitations of current ‘mainstream’ AI work on argumentation. The main-
stream approach essentially regards the problem of argument evaluation to be a question of defining the appropriate
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for it can be constructed that survives all attacks by counterarguments that can be constructed from the same set of
statements. (This idea can be refined in various ways but that is not the issue here.) This ‘relational’ approach ignores
that arguments are embedded in a procedural context, in that they can be seen as having been put forward on one
side or the other of an issue during a dialogue between (human and/or artificial) agents. This dialogical context must
be taken into account when evaluating arguments. The information provided by a dialogue for constructing and eval-
uating arguments is richer than just a set of sentences. The context can tell us whether some party has questioned
or conceded a statement, or whether a decision has been taken, perhaps by a third party, to accept or reject a claim,
taking into consideration the arguments which have been made. Such decisions may be taken at intermediate states of
the dialogue, for example when some alternatives are eliminated after brainstorming during a deliberation. Moreover,
the dialogue context may provide information about the allocation of the burden of proof for each statement. Legal
applications may require the burden of production and burden of persuasion to be handled separately, with a different
responsible party and applicable proof standard for each [35]. This allocation may well change over the course of the
dialogue. In the law of civil procedure, for example, the burden of proof may be allocated to the party who has the
better access to the evidence. Finally, the proof standard may depend on the phase of the dialogue. For example, a
weak proof standard may be appropriate during the brainstorming phase of a deliberation or during the pleading phase
of a legal conflict.
The Carneades model has been designed to be applied in such rich dialogical contexts. The evaluation of arguments
in Carneades depends on whether statements have been questioned or decided; the allocation of the burden of proof;
and the proof standard applicable to questioned statements. All these elements depend on the stage and context of the
dialogue in which the arguments have been put forward.
An influential classification of dialogue types is that of Walton and Krabbe [51]. For present purposes their dis-
tinction between persuasion and deliberation dialogue is especially relevant. The goal of a deliberation dialogue is to
solve a problem while the goal of a persuasion dialogue is to test whether a claim is acceptable. The present version
of Carneades is meant to support persuasion dialogues. In such dialogues, two or more participants try to resolve a
difference of opinion by arguing about the tenability of a claim, each trying to persuade the other participants to adopt
their point of view. Dialogue systems regulate such things as the preconditions and effects of speech acts, including
their effects on the commitments of the participants, as well as criteria for terminating the dialogue and determining
its outcome. Good dialogue systems regulate all this in such a way that conflicting viewpoints can be resolved in a
way that is both fair and effective [24].
It is important to note that although Carneades has been designed to be embedded in a procedural context, it
does not itself define a dialogue protocol. No roles, speech acts, termination criteria, or procedural rules are defined.
Instead Carneades is intended to be a reusable component providing services generally needed when specifying such
argumentation protocols.
In line with prior AI research, arguments in Carneades are defeasible, i.e., arguments can be defeated by counterar-
guments. The Carneades model of defeasible argument is founded on Walton’s theory of argumentation schemes [48].
Argumentation schemes express reasoning policies, i.e. conventional patterns of reasoning, and thus are dependent on
the norms of the community. Arguments in Carneades are designed to model instantiations of argumentation schemes.
Besides being defeasible, argumentation schemes have a dialogical aspect in that they come with a set of critical ques-
tions [20], which enumerate ways of challenging arguments created using the scheme. Critical questions differ with
regard to their impact on the burden of proof [3,43]. For some critical questions, merely asking the question is enough
to shift the burden of proof back to the party who put forward the argument to answer the question. For other critical
questions, the party who raised the question also has the burden of answering it. Carneades models critical questions
as additional premises of an argument, with a different type of premise, called assumptions and exceptions, for each
kind of question.1
The Carneades model is the latest result of a research effort that started with the Pleadings Game [14], a com-
putational model of civil pleading in Anglo-American Law. Besides a dialogue protocol, the Pleadings Game also
1 In an earlier version of Carneades, as reported in [17], assumptions were called ‘presumptions’. This usage however conflicted with the meaning
of ‘presumption’ in our main intended application field, the legal domain. In the law, merely questioning a legal presumption is not enough to shift
the burden of proof to the other party; the burden of proof is on the party interested in rebutting the presumption. For example, the presumption of
innocence in criminal cases places the burden on the prosecution to prove guilt.
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dialogue state was taken into account by this evaluation. (Burden of proof and proof standards were not modeled in the
Pleadings Game.) Whereas statements and arguments were modeled in the Pleadings Game using a specific logical
calculus, Geffner’s logic of Conditional Entailment [12], Carneades is designed to be an open integration framework
for various kinds of argumentation schemes, using whatever kind of knowledge representation is appropriate for each
kind of scheme. Thus, like Dung’s abstract model of argument [8], Carneades does not depend on a particular logical
language for expressing statements, inference rules or argumentation schemes.
Another ancestor of Carneades is Zeno [15], an argumentation model based on Horst Rittel’s idea of an Issue-Based
Information System (IBIS) [38]. In IBIS, issues can be raised, ideas to resolve them can be proposed and arguments pro
and con the various ideas can be put forward. Zeno was intended to be simple enough for use in web-based mediation
systems and targeted to support practical decisions in deliberation dialogues, about what action to take. Later versions
of Zeno were used in several e-democracy pilot projects [16]. Like the present work, Zeno included a model of proof
standards and was intended as an integration framework for arguments from “heterogeneous information sources and
models”. Whereas Zeno was designed for deliberation dialogues and based on the Rittel’s IBIS model, Carneades has
been designed primarily for persuasion dialogues and is based on Walton’s philosophy of argumentation. It remains
for future work to see whether Carneades will also be suitable for deliberation dialogues.2
The rest of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 presents some features of (natural) argumentation that
motivate the design of Carneades, in particular argumentation schemes, dialogical attitudes towards statements, and
the notion of burden of proof. Section 3 defines the structure of argument graphs and illustrates them with examples
from related work by Toulmin and Pollock. Section 4 formally defines the acceptability of statements in argument
graphs in terms of proof standards, premise types, and the dialectical status of statements in dialogues. Section 5
returns to the subject of critical questions and illustrates how they can be modeled using Carneades. Section 6 discusses
how to model the distribution of the burdens of production and persuasion using Carneades. Section 7 presents related
work on computational models of argument. Finally, we close in Section 8 with a recapitulation of conclusions and
ideas for future work.
2. Theoretical background
In this section we look in some more detail at some features of natural argumentation that motivate the design of
Carneades. In particular, we discuss argumentation schemes, dialogical attitudes towards statements, and the notion
of burden of proof.
Argumentation schemes are stereotypical patterns of reasoning used in everyday conversational argumentation, and
in other contexts as well, like legal and scientific argumentation. They represent patterns of non-deductive reasoning
that have long been studied in argumentation theory. Historically, they are the descendants of the so-called topics of
Aristotle, thought to be useful for inventing arguments as well as for evaluating them. In recent times, many schemes
have been identified and studied [11].3 Despite this body of work, little has been done in argumentation theory to
formalize the logical structure of the schemes. By contrast, artificial intelligence has become increasingly interested
in argumentation schemes, due to their potential for making significant improvements in the reasoning capabilities of
artificial agents [3,37,43].
In argumentation theory, the device used for evaluating schemes [20] is that of a specific set of critical questions
matching each scheme. The questions represent attacks, challenges or criticisms that, if not answered adequately,
make the argument fitting the scheme default. The critical questions evidently need to be formalized along with the
scheme, in order to capture the logic of each scheme as a defeasible argument. The biggest problem is how to carry
2 Persuasion dialogues, like deliberation, can be about a course of action. The difference between persuasion and deliberation is the starting
point and goal of the dialogue, not its subject matter. A persuasion dialogue begins with the making of a claim and has the goal of persuading the
opponent to accept this claim. Such claims can be about what course of action would be best, or any other topic. Deliberation dialogues, on the
other hand, begin with a problem and have the goal of finding a solution to this problem. Typically, the first phase of a deliberation has the goal
of identifying stakeholders and their interests. Only later, perhaps after brainstorming, are proposals for actions collected. When such a proposal is
defended, a deliberation dialogue can temporarily shift to a persuasion dialogue.
3 We do not address in this article how argumentation schemes develop or evolve, or how to design good argumentation schemes.
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between a questioner and an answerer.4
Let us illustrate the concept of argumentation schemes with the scheme for arguments from expert opinion, as
formulated in [49, p. 210], with some minor notational changes:
Major Premise. Source E is an expert in the subject domain S containing proposition A.
Minor Premise. E asserts that proposition A in domain S is true.
Conclusion. A may plausibly be taken as true.
The six basic critical questions matching the appeal to expert opinion [49, p. 223] are the following.
(1) How credible is E as an expert source?
(2) Is E an expert in the field that A is in?
(3) Does E’s testimony imply A?
(4) Is E reliable?
(5) Is A consistent with the testimony of other experts?
(6) Is A supported by evidence?
The method of evaluating an argument like one from expert opinion is by a shifting of burden of proof in a dialogue
[49]. When the respondent asks one of the six critical questions a burden of proof shifts back to the proponent’s
side, defeating or undercutting the argument temporarily until the critical question has been answered successfully.
However, as will be suggested below, there are differences between the critical questions on how strongly or weakly
they produce such a shift.
The notion of a shift in the burden of proof from one side to another is a problematic topic in the special kind of
case in which an argument has been put forward and a critical question matching the scheme for that argument has
been asked. Does merely asking the question make the argument default, or is the burden on the questioner to provide
evidence? Providing a dialogue mechanism to handle a representation of how the burden of proof should shift in such
an exchange goes beyond what is currently available. Such observations have led to two theories about the allocation
of the burden of proof when critical questions are asked [50].
According to one theory, when the respondent asks a critical question, the burden of proof automatically shifts
back to the proponent’s side to provide an answer, and if she fails to do so, the argument defaults (is defeated). On
this theory, only if the proponent provides an appropriate answer is the plausibility of the original argument restored.
This could be called the shifting burden theory, or SB theory.
According to the other theory, asking a critical question should not be enough to make the original argument
default. The question, if asked, needs to be backed up with some evidence before it can shift any burden back to the
proponent. This could be called the backup evidence theory, or BE theory.
In AI it has recently been observed that argumentation schemes are related to defeasible inference rules in non-
monotonic logic. Bex et al. [3] argue that argumentation schemes can be formalized as Pollock’s [29] defeasible
reasons and that critical questions that should be supported by backup evidence can be regarded as undercutters to such
defeasible reasons. (Undercutters [29] provide reasons for breaking the connection between premises and conclusion
of another reason in the given circumstances. They can be used to express exceptions to defeasible reasons.) Verheij
[43] proposes a similar account, suggesting that it may be useful to handle different kinds of questions differently. He
begins by showing that critical questions can have four different kinds of roles.
(1) They can be used to question whether a premise of a scheme holds.
(2) They can point to exceptional situations in which a scheme should not be used.
(3) They can set conditions for the proper use of a scheme.
(4) They can point to other arguments that might be used to attack the scheme.
4 Dialogues do not require multiple agents. A single agent can be viewed as arguing with himself, switching back and forth between pro and con
viewpoints. The proponent and opponent of a dialogue are roles, not agents. Any number of agents can occupy these roles.
T.F. Gordon et al. / Artificial Intelligence 171 (2007) 875–896 879Verheij then applies these ideas within his Deflog logic [42]. Critical questions of type (2) undercut an argument,
those of type (3) refute specific implicit assumptions on which the argument rests, while those of type (4) point to
‘rebutting’ counter-arguments. (Rebuttals are in Pollock [29] counterarguments with a conclusion that is contradictory
to that of its target.) Finally, Verheij [43] argues that critical questions that address the premises of a scheme are
redundant, because they merely ask whether the premise is true.
Such accounts in terms of ordinary premises and exceptions of a defeasible inference rule provide a natural expla-
nation as to why some critical questions shift the burden of answering back to the proponent of the argument while
other questions must be backed up with evidence. However, they leave another issue unaddressed, viz. the dialogical
status of (ordinary) premises of an argumentation scheme. Verheij’s claim that critical questions about the premises
of a scheme are redundant makes sense in a logical setting, with a static information state, in which the only issue is
whether a premise is given or derivable from what is given. In a dialogical setting, however, with a possibly changing
information state, this is different. Suppose, for example, that an argument instantiating the scheme from Expert Opin-
ion has been put forward and the other side has not yet said anything in response. The question then is whether in the
current dialogical context the conclusion of the argument is acceptable. This boils down to the question whether si-
lence implies consent to the major and minor premise or not. Or to give a legal example, suppose the plaintiff in a legal
dispute claims that he and the defendant have a contract, arguing that he made an offer accepted by the defendant and
citing the legal rule that an offer and acceptance constitute a contract. Although the argument is logically perfectly
acceptable, according to Dutch civil law, e.g., it is not sufficient, since claims about offer and acceptance must be
backed by evidence. Suppose the plaintiff provides such evidence, for example in the form of witness testimonies.
If the defendant continues not to reply, the plantiff’s argument will now be acceptable, since the Dutch law of civil
procedure states that factual claims not questioned by the other party must be accepted by the court.
The upshot of all this is that in a dialogical context different kinds of premises must be distinguished: those that
must always be supported with further grounds; those that can be assumed until they have been questioned; and those
that do not hold in the absence of evidence to the contrary. In this article we will call the first kind ‘ordinary premises’,
the second kind ‘assumptions’ and third kind ‘exceptions’. Note that assumptions are not the same as the negation
of exceptions.5 We claim that ‘static’, relational AI models of argumentation cannot handle the distinctions between
these kinds of premises, since these distinctions only make sense in a procedural context. Carneades, by contrast, has
been designed for use in such procedural contexts.
The final feature of argumentation motivating the design of Carneades concerns the allocation of the burden of
proof, especially in legal domain. The general intuitions here are very much related to the distinction between the
types of premises just discussed. When a party provides an argument instantiating some applicable scheme, the burden
is on that party to prove its ordinary premises and (once challenged) its assumptions, after which the burden shifts to
the other party to defeat the argument by rebutting it or pointing out exceptional circumstances. Legal systems make
fine-grained distinctions between different kinds of burdens of proof and we want Carneades to account for these
distinctions.
In civil law suits, the plaintiff generally has the burden of proof. This seems simple enough, but the notion of burden
of proof can refer to two different things [52, p. 270], often called the risk of non-persuasion, or burden of persuasion,
and the burden of production: “The risk of non-persuasion operates when the case has come into the hands of the jury,
while the duty of producing evidence implies a liability to a ruling by the judge disposing of the issue without leaving
the question open to the jury’s deliberations”. Wigmore wrote that the risk of non-persuasion never shifts, but the duty
of producing evidence to satisfy the judge does have this shifting characteristic [52, pp. 285–286]. McCormick on
Evidence [40, p. 425] defines the burden of producing evidence in these terms: “The burden of producing evidence
on an issue means the liability to an adverse ruling (generally a finding or directed verdict) if evidence on the issue
has not been produced”. In contrast, the burden of persuasion [40, p. 426] means that if the party having that burden
has failed to satisfy it, the issue is to be decided against that party. Park, Leonard and Goldberg [26, p. 88] wrote that
the burden of proof involves two things—the amount of evidence required to establish the ultimate question of fact,
and the allocation of the risk of non-persuasion to that degree. The burden of persuasion, in their terms [26, p. 89],
defines the degree to which the fact-finder must be persuaded in order for the ultimate claim to be proved, and which
5 Thus our use of the term ‘assumption’ deviates, e.g., from Bondarenko et al. [4], where it is used for negations of what we call exceptions.
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so forth. This leads us in turn to the question of proof standards.
Both burdens can be distributed over the parties. For example, the plaintiff usually has the burden of production
for the ‘legal-operative’ facts of his main claim, while the defendant has the burden of production for exceptions. The
same can happen with the burden of persuasion: while the plaintiff has the burden of persuasion for his main claim, as
observed by Prakken and Sartor [35] the burden of persuasion for other statements can be distributed over the parties.
In the case of exceptions, sometimes only the burden of production rests on the defendant; once this burden is satisfied,
the plaintiff has the burden of persuading the court that the exception does not hold. This is the case, for instance, with
all exceptions in criminal law. Carneades, we claim, is able to handle these different ways of distributing the burdens
of production and persuasion.
We now see that, when discussing above how critical questions affect the burden of proof, we meant the burden
of production in particular. In formal accounts, distributions of the burden of production can be simply expressed
by formulating exceptions. However, as shown by Prakken [30], distributions of the burden of persuasion cannot be
expressed by current ‘mainstream’ AI formalisms for argumentation. In particular, they cannot express the distinction
between cases where the exception has to be proven (i.e., a decision maker has to be convinced that the exception
is true) and cases where the exception merely has to be made plausible (i.e., a decision maker would have reason to
doubt it is not true). Current non-monotonic logics can only model the latter kind of situation. Accordingly, the system
of Prakken and Sartor [34], based on Dung’s grounded semantics, was adjusted in [30] to cope with this.
The approach taken in Carneades to the problem of determining how the burden of proof should be distributed is
as follows. The burden of production is distributed by dividing premises into different types: evidence for ordinary
premises and (once challenged) assumptions must be produced by the proponent of the argument with these premises,
while evidence for exceptions must be produced by the respondent. In addition some initially low proof standard needs
to be assigned to the statement of each premise. After the burden of production has been met, the burden of persuasion
can be distributed by raising the proof standard assigned to the statement. Changing the proof standard can also cause
the burden to shift from one party to another.
Summarizing, Carneades allows the burdens of production and persuasion to be allocated, separately, to either
the proponent or the respondent and modified during the course of the dialogue. The initial allocation of the burden
of production is regulated by the premise types of the argumentation scheme applied. The burden of persuasion
is allocated by assigning the appropriate proof standard. As the dialogue progresses, subject to the argumentation
protocol, the burdens may be reallocated by changing the assignment of premise types and proof standards via speech
acts designed for this purpose.
3. Argument graphs
We begin by defining the structure of argument graphs. Our conception of argument graphs is similar to Pollock’s
concept of an inference graph [29], in that there are nodes in the graph representing statements (propositions) and links
which indicate inference relations between statements. Unlike Dung’s model [8], in which the internal structure of
arguments is irrelevant, our model of the acceptability of statements makes use of and depends on the usual conception
of argument in the argumentation theory literature, where arguments are instantiations of argumentation schemes
linking a set of premises to a conclusion. The premises and the conclusion of arguments are statements about the world,
whether empirical or institutional, which may be accepted or rejected. For the purpose of evaluating arguments, the
syntax of statements is not important. We only require the ability to determine whether two statements are syntactically
equal and some way to denote the logical complement of a statement.
Definition 1 (Statements). Let 〈statement,=, complement〉 be a structure, where statement denotes the set of declar-
ative sentences in some language, = is an equality relation, modeled as a function of type statement × statement →
boolean, and complement is a function of type statement → statement mapping a statement to its logical complement.
If s is a statement, the complement of s is denoted s.
Next, to support defeasible argumentation and allow the burden of proof to be distributed, we distinguish several
types of premises.
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(1) If s is a statement, then s, called an ordinary premise, is a premise.
(2) If s is a statement, then •s, called an assumption, is a premise.
(3) If s is a statement, then ◦s, called an exception, is a premise.
(4) Nothing else is a premise.
Now we are ready to define the structure of arguments.
Definition 3 (Arguments). An argument is a tuple 〈c, d,p〉, where c is a statement, d ∈ {pro, con} and p ∈ 2premise. If
a is an argument 〈c, d,p〉, then conclusion(a) = c, direction(a) = d and premises(a) = p.
Note that an argument may have an empty set of premises. One difference between arguments and inference rules
is evident in the distinction between pro and con arguments. Semantically, con arguments are instances of presumptive
inference rules for the negation of the conclusion; if the premises of a con argument hold, this provides reasons to
reject the conclusion or, equivalently, to accept its logical complement. Our approach abstracts completely from the
syntax of the language for statements. Also, the use of both pro and con arguments is in accordance with our view of
argumentation as a dialectical process. The arguments pro and con some statement need to be ordered or otherwise
aggregated to resolve the conflict.
We assume arguments are put forward by the participants of a dialogue, where a dialogue is a sequence of speech
acts such as asserting claims, conceding or questioning claims and making arguments. Speech acts can be modeled as
functions which map a state of the dialogue to another state. Argument graphs, defined next, have been designed to
be a part of these dialogue states, as a structure for keeping track of the arguments which have been made and their
relations.
An argument graph is a kind of proof tree in that it provides a basis for explanations and justifications. The accept-
ability relation between argument graphs and statements is intended to model the sufficiency of the proof: intuitively,
a statement is acceptable given the arguments if and only if the argument graph is a proof of the statement. This dis-
tinguishes the acceptability relation from the defeasible consequence relation of non-monotonic logics. In a calculus
for such logics, assuming it is correct and complete, a statement is a defeasible consequence of a set of statements if
and only if the statement is derivable in the calculus, whether or not such a proof has in fact been derived.
Argument graphs have two kinds of nodes, statement nodes and argument nodes. The edges of the graph link up the
premises and conclusions of the arguments.6 In Carneades argument graphs, at most one statement node is allowed
for every statement s and its complement, s. A statement and its complement are not just two unrelated statements.
A dispute about s is also a dispute about s. An argument pro one is an argument con the other. If one of these
statements is accepted, the other must be rejected. There are no restrictions on the use of statements in premises. Both
s and s may be used in premises, no matter which statement is represented by a statement node in the argument graph.
Restricting statement nodes to at most one node for each s and s pair avoids the duplication of all arguments pro s as
arguments con s and helps to reduce the complexity of diagrams of the graphs. If s is represented by a statement node
in an argumentation graph, then a premise using s is called a negative premise. Ordinary premises, assumptions and
exceptions may all be negative, using s, •s, and ◦s.
In the diagrams of argument graphs which follow, statements are displayed as boxes and arguments as circles or
rounded boxes. Different arrowhead shapes are used to distinguish pro and con arguments as well as the different kinds
of premises. Pro arguments are indicated using ordinary arrowheads; con arguments with open arrowheads. Ordinary
premises are represented as edges with no arrowheads, assumptions with closed-dot arrowheads and exceptions with
open-dot arrowheads. Negative premises have an additional tee mark (a short perpendicular line). Notice that the
6 Notice that argument graphs in Carneades are different than the dialectical graphs of the first author’s Pleadings Game [13,15]. These dialectical
graphs had only one kind of node, for arguments represented as sets of statements, and their edges modeled support, defeat and rebuttal relations
between arguments. Argument graphs in Carneades have a bit more in common with the dialectical graphs of the same author’s Zeno system [15],
whose position nodes are like statement nodes, but arguments in Zeno are modeled as a binary relation between two positions and thus do not
support arguments with multiple premises, let alone different types of premises.
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premise type cannot be adequately represented using statement labels: since argument graphs are not restricted to
trees, a statement may be used in several premises with different types.
Fig. 1 illustrates this method of diagramming argument graphs with a toy legal argument. The issue is whether there
is a contract. One con argument, a2, states there is not a contract because the agreement is not in writing although
it is for the sale of real estate. The other con argument, a3, states the agreement is not in writing since is was by
email. Argument a1 states there is a contract, because agreements are contracts unless one of the parties is a minor.
Argument a5 states the agreement is for the sale of real estate, assuming there is a deed, i.e. a written instrument
conveying the property. Argument a4 uses the deed as evidence of there having been an agreement. These last two
arguments, especially, may not be realistic, but were contrived only to illustrate how argument graphs are not restricted
to trees and how a statement can be used in different types of premises in several arguments.
Although argument graphs are not restricted to trees, they are not completely general; we do not allow cycles. This
restriction is intended to assure the decidability of the acceptability property of statements. At first sight, the condition
that argument graphs be acyclic would seem to be a severe limitation. However, things are not that serious. Firstly, in
systems using Dung’s approach most cycles in realistic examples are two-cycles between arguments with incompatible
conclusions. In Carneades, these can be represented as a pair of arguments pro and con the same statement, which
does not introduce cycles into the argument graph. Next, cycles caused by indirectly using a statement in support of
itself are also excluded in many other systems. This leaves cycles through exceptions, as shown in Fig. 2.
Such examples have always been somewhat problematic in non-monotonic logic. For instance, in Dung’s [8] ab-
stract framework defeat graphs with odd cycles may have no stable extensions. Also, intuitions differ on the proper
treatment of cycles [1]. Prior ‘relational’ approaches to this problem, such as Dung’s preferred and grounded seman-
tics as alternatives for stable semantics, are not directly transferable to Carneades, with its dialogical and procedural
elements. We therefore leave an extension to graphs that allow for cycles through exceptions for future work.
Definition 4 (Argument graphs). An argument-graph is a labeled, finite, directed, acyclic, bipartite graph, consisting
of argument nodes and statement nodes. The edges link the argument nodes to the statements in the premises and
conclusion of each argument. At most one statement node is allowed for each statement s and its complement, s.
This completes the formal definition of the structure of arguments and argument graphs. Let us now discuss briefly
the expressiveness of this model, beginning by comparing our approach with Toulmin’s argumentation scheme [41].
Toulmin’s scheme can be instantiated to produce arguments in Carneades with four premises: a minor premise called
the datum; a defeasible major premise called the warrant, an additional piece of data supporting the warrant, called
backing, and an exception, somewhat confusingly called a rebuttal. Toulmin’s model also contains a qualifier stating
the probative value of the inference (e.g. presumably, or necessarily). The strength of arguments is modeled by a
partial order in Carneades, as explained in Section 4 .
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Fig. 3. Reconstruction of Toulmin diagrams.
To illustrate, Fig. 3 reconstructs Toulmin’s standard example about British citizenship in Carneades. Notice that
the ‘rebuttal’ is modeled as an exception and the backing as an assumption. Both the datum and warrant are ordinary
premises. Alternatively, backing could be modeled as the premise of an additional argument pro the warrant, by
generalizing the concept of an argumentation scheme to cover patterns with multiple arguments.
In this diagram, the premise links have been labeled with the role each premise plays in Toulmin’s scheme. This
also illustrates the distinction between premise types in Carneades and the roles of premises in argumentation schemes.
These are orthogonal properties of premises.
Our model of argument is rich enough to handle Pollock’s rebuttals and undercutting defeaters [29] as well as
premise defeat. Rebuttals can be modeled as arguments in the opposite direction for the same conclusion.7 (If an
argument a1 is pro some statement s, then some argument a2 con s is a rebuttal of a1, and vice versa.) Premises can
be defeated by further arguments pro or con the statement of the premise, depending on the type of premise.
As for undercutting defeaters, according to Pollock these are exceptions to defeasible ‘reasons’. Accordingly, un-
dercutters can be modeled directly using Carneades exceptions. Consider Pollock’s example of something looking red
being a reason for believing it is red, unless it turns out to be illuminated by a red light. Fig. 4 shows a reconstruction
in Carneades of this argument.
Exceptions to defeasible generalizations, such as legal rules, can be understood as critical questions of argumen-
tation schemes developed for reasoning with these generalizations. Consider, for example, a legal rule prohibiting
vehicles in parks [19]. An argumentation scheme for reasoning with legal rules might include critical questions for
challenging the validity of the rule or asking whether the rule is excluded by some other rule with higher priority
in a particular case [44]. For example, one could use the second critical question to undercut an argument for some
7 One must be careful not to confuse Pollock’s rebuttals with Toulmin’s, which would be represented as undercutters in Pollock’s model.
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ambulance not being allowed in a park, by citing another rule excluding ambulances on duty. Such critical questions
can also be modeled using exceptions in Carneades.
Two kinds of arguments, convergent and linked, are distinguished in the literature [47]. Convergent arguments
provide multiple reasons for a conclusion, each of which alone can be sufficient to accept the conclusion. Convergent
arguments are handled in our approach by multiple arguments for the same conclusion. Linked arguments, on the
other hand, consist of two or more premises which all must hold for the argument to provide significant support for
its conclusion. They are handled in our approach by defining arguments to consist of a set of premises, rather than a
single premise, and defining arguments to be defensible only if all of their premises hold. (The concept of argument
defensibility is defined below.)
Assumptions and exceptions can be used to model Walton’s concept of critical questions [48]. Critical questions
enumerate specific ways to defeat arguments matching some argumentation scheme. But so long as an issue has not
been raised by actually asking some critical question, we would like to be able to express which answer to assume. The
distinction between assumptions and exceptions here provides this ability. Section 5 illustrates one way to reconstruct
the scheme for arguments from expert opinion using Carneades.
4. Argument evaluation
By argument evaluation we mean determining whether a statement is acceptable in an argument graph.8 Intuitively,
a statement is acceptable if a decision to accept the statement as true can be justified or explained given the arguments
which have been put forward in the dialogue. The definition of the acceptability of statements is recursive. The
acceptability of a statement depends on its proof standard. Whether or not a statement’s proof standard is satisfied
depends on the defensibility of the arguments pro and con this statement. The defensibility of an argument depends
on whether or not its premises hold. Finally, we end up where we began: whether or not a premise holds can depend
on whether or not the premise’s statement is acceptable. Since the definitions are recursive, we cannot avoid making
forward references to functions which will be defined later.
To evaluate a set of arguments in an argument graph, we require some additional information. Firstly, we need to
know the current dialectical status of each statement in the dialogue, i.e. whether it is stated, questioned, accepted,
or rejected. This status information is pragmatic; the status of statements is set by speech acts in the dialogue, such
as asking a question, putting forward an argument or making a decision. Secondly, we assume that a proof standard
has been assigned to each statement. In the following, let proof-standard be an enumeration of some proof standards.
Finally, we assume a strict partial ordering on arguments, which we will denote with >. Let a1 and a2 be arguments. If
a1 > a2 we say that a1 has priority over a2. Let us formalize these requirements by postulating an argument context
as follows.
Definition 5 (Argument context). Let C, the argument context, be a tuple 〈status,ps,>〉, where status is a function of
type statement → {stated,questioned,accepted, rejected}, ps is a function of type statement → proof-standard and
8 In argumentation theory, argument evaluation has a somewhat broader meaning, including such tasks as matching arguments to argumentation
schemes and revealing missing premises.
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to s is the complement of the proof standard assigned to s and
• if status(s) = stated then status(s) = stated,
• if status(s) = questioned then status(s) = questioned,
• if status(s) = accepted then status(s) = rejected, and
• if status(s) = rejected then status(s) = accepted.
The constraints on the status of statements in this definition serve two purposes. First, they assure that whenever
a statement is stated or questioned its complement is also, implicitly, stated or questioned. Stating or questioning a
statement does not imply the assertion of some position or viewpoint pro or con the statement. Stating a statement
merely introduces it into the dialogue. Questioning a statement merely makes an issue out of the statement. Second,
the constraints assure that whenever a statement is accepted its complement is rejected and vice versa. A decision to
accept one is simultaneously a decision to reject the alternative.
In the definitions which follow, an argument context is presumed.
Definition 6 (Acceptability of statements). Let acceptable be a function of type statement × argument-graph →
boolean. A statement s is acceptable in an argument graph G if and only if it satisfies its proof standard:
acceptable(s,G) = satisfies(s,ps(s),G)
Definition 7 (Satisfaction of proof standards). A proof standard is a function of type statement × argument-graph →
boolean. A statement s is satisfied by a proof standard f in an argument graph G if and only if f (s,G) is true.
The following proof standards are defined in this article. We do not claim these particular proof standards are
exhaustive. Others can be defined similarly.
SE (Scintilla of Evidence). A statement meets this standard iff it is supported by at least one defensible pro argument.
BA (Best Argument). A statement meets this standard iff it is supported by some defensible pro argument with priority
over all defensible con arguments.
DV (Dialectical Validity). A statement meets this standard iff it is supported by at least one defensible pro argument
and none of its con arguments are defensible.
In addition, a proof standard can be derived from another by switching the roles of pro and con arguments in the
standard:
Definition 8 (Complement of a proof standard). The complement of a proof standard σ , denoted σ , is the standard
which results by switching the roles of pro and con arguments in the definition of σ .
For example, the complement of the BA proof standard, BA, is satisfied iff the statement is supported by some
defensible con argument with priority over its strongest defensible pro argument. In principle a statement can satisfy
both a proof standard and its complement, highlighting the difference between acceptability and truth. The arguments
can be sufficient to justify a decision either way without being inconsistent. In practice, however, this will be the case
only with very weak proof standards, such as scintilla of evidence. If there exists a defensible pro argument and a
defensible con argument, then both SE and its complement, SE, are satisfied.
Further research is required to define and validate models of proof standards for various applications. In particular
we do not claim that any of the standards defined here adequately model legal proof standards.
The standards defined here can be ordered by their relative strength:
DV > BA > SE
9 Should the need arise to make the proof standard of a statement depend on the argument in which the statement is used as a premise, the ps
function of the context could be extended to be of type statement × argument → proof-standard.
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standard uses a strict partial ordering on arguments to resolve conflicts. Recall that we assume such an ordering as
part of the argument context.
All of the proof standards defined above depend on a determination of the defensibility of arguments. Defensibility
is defined next.
Definition 9 (Defensibility of arguments). Let defensible be a function of type argument × argument-graph →
boolean. An argument α is defensible in an argument graph G if and only if all of its premises hold in the argu-
ment graph: defensible(α,G) = all(λp.holds(p,G))(premises α).10
Now we come to the last definition required for evaluating arguments, of the holds predicate. This is where the
dialectical status of a statement and the type of premises come into play.
Definition 10 (Holding of premises). Let holds be a function of type premise × argument-graph → boolean. Whether
or not a premise holds depends on its type. Thus, there are the following cases:
If p is an ordinary premise, s, then
holds(p,G) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
acceptable(s,G) if status(s) = stated
acceptable(s,G) if status(s) = questioned
true if status(s) = accepted
false if status(s) = rejected
If p is an assumption, •s, then
holds(p,G) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
true if status(s) = stated
acceptable(s,G) if status(s) = questioned
true if status(s) = accepted
false if status(s) = rejected
Finally, if p is an exception, ◦s, then
holds(p,G) =
⎧⎪⎨
⎪⎩
¬acceptable(s,G) if status(s) = stated
¬acceptable(s,G) if status(s) = questioned
false if status(s) = accepted
true if status(s) = rejected
It can be proven that there is always a unique and complete assignment of ‘acceptable’ or ‘not acceptable’ to
statements, and of ‘holds’ or ‘not holds’ to premises.
Theorem 1. For every argument context C with proof standards SE, BA or DV and every argument graph G:
acceptable and holds are total functions.
Moreover, if the BA or DV proof standard is assigned to a statement in the context, it can never be the case that
both the statement and its complement are acceptable.
Theorem 2. For every argument context C with proof standards BA or DV and every argument graph G, no statement
s exists such that s and s are both acceptable.
The proofs are in Appendix A. The important thing to notice is that whether or not a premise holds depends in this
model not only on the arguments which have been put forward, but also on the type of premise and the status of the
premise’s statement in the context. We assume that the status of a statement progresses in the course of the dialogue:
10 Here ‘all’ is a higher-order function, not a quantifier, applied to an anonymous function, represented with λ, as in lambda calculus.
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statement holds at this stage of the dialogue depends on the kind of premise. Ordinary premises hold only if the
statement is acceptable given whatever arguments have been put forward; assumptions hold unconditionally.11
This is the only difference between ordinary premises and assumptions in the model. Exceptions hold at this stage
only if the statement is not acceptable given the arguments put forward.
(2) At some point a participant may explicitly make an issue out of a statement, by questioning it. Now both ordinary
premises and assumptions which use this statement hold only if they are acceptable. Exceptions continue to hold
only if the statement is not acceptable. We assume that arguments will be exchanged in a dialogue for some period
of time, and that during this phase the acceptability of statements will be in flux.
(3) Finally, at some point a decision will be made to either accept or reject some statement. Accepting a state-
ment implicitly rejects its complement and vice versa. The model constrains the decisions which can be justified
or explained. Any interested person can check whether the decisions are justified given the arguments made
and the applicable proof standards. After a decision has been made, it is respected by the model. For exam-
ple, ordinary premises with accepted statements hold and ordinary premises with rejected statements do not
hold.
5. Modeling critical questions in Carneades
When the scheme for arguments from expert opinion is instantiated to create a specific argument, the critical
questions can be represented in Carneades as assumptions and exceptions. Whether an assumption or exception is
appropriate depends on who should have the burden of production, which is a policy issue dependent on the domain.
If the respondent, the person who poses the critical question, should have the burden of production, then the critical
question should be modeled as an exception. If, on the other hand, the proponent, the party who used the scheme
to construct the argument, should have the burden of production, then the critical question should be modeled as an
assumption.
The distinction between assumptions and exceptions in Carneades allows answers to be assumed for critical ques-
tions which have yet to be asked. Which type of premise is appropriate depends on the policy of the argumentation
scheme. If a new argumentation scheme is being modeled, the premise type can be used to clearly express the desired
policy. Modeling an existing argumentation scheme requires the scheme to be interpreted to determine the policy
intended by its drafters, similar to the way legislation must be interpreted. In our interpretation of the scheme for
arguments from expert opinion, the shifting burden theory seems appropriate for the expertise and backup evidence
questions, since experts are generally credible sources of knowledge in their field, who typically base their testimony
on evidence. Thus these questions have been modeled as assumptions. But the backing evidence theory seems more
appropriate for the trustworthiness and consistency questions, since it is easier to produce evidence of instances of
unreliable or inconsistent behavior than to try to prove that no instances of such behavior have occurred. Applying
the general principle of allocating the burden of production to the party with better access to the evidence, we have
modeled these questions as exceptions.
The scheme for argument from expert opinion can be recast to fit the Carneades model as follows, where ‘premise’
here means ordinary premise:
Premise. E is an expert in the subject domain S containing the proposition A.
Premise. E asserts A.
Assumption. E is a credible expert.
Exception. E is not reliable.
Exception. A is not consistent with the testimony of other experts.
Assumption. A is based on evidence.
Conclusion. A.
11 Both a statement and its complement may be assumed at the same time, but only in the context of premises of different arguments.
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6. Modeling distributions of proof burdens in Carneades
In this section we illustrate how premise types and proof standards in Carneades can be used to allocate various
burdens of proof, and the importance of being able to do so, reusing Prakken and Sartor’s example about a murder
trial [35].
According to Section §187 of the California Penal Code, murder is (unlawful) killing with ‘malice aforethought’.
Section §197 states an exception for self-defense. Let’s suppose the criminal proceedings have been initiated by
the prosecution filing a complaint in which it makes its first arguments, by applying a scheme for arguments from
legal rules to Section §187 and providing enough evidence of killing and malice aforethought to meet the burden of
production required to bring the case to trial. Let us assume the defense has accepted the killing and malice elements
of the crime, so these are not at issue. Using a simplified scheme for arguments from legal rules derived from Reason-
Based Logic [44], the argument can be modeled in Carneades as shown in Fig. 5.
Fig. 5 illustrates how premise types are assigned by applying argumentation schemes. The appropriate type of
premise is a policy issue which must be addressed when developing argumentation schemes and legal rules. In the
scheme for arguments from legal rules used here, the validity of a legal rule is assumed, and thus must be supported
with evidence only if questioned; being excluded by some other rule is an exception, and the elements of the crime,
killing and malice here, are ordinary premises which must always be supported with evidence. In the example we
assume sufficient evidence, not shown, was provided to justify the acceptance of the killing and malice ordinary
premises.
This figure, as well as the others in this section, were generated and labeled by the implementation of Carneades.
The statements shown in gray have been accepted (killing, malice) or are acceptable (murder). In the initial context,
all statements are assigned the lowest proof standard, scintilla of the evidence (SE), and no argument has priority over
any other. The murder charge is acceptable in this initial context, given the argument and the claims accepted by the
defense. The prosecution has met its burden of production.
Next, the defense puts forward its self-defense argument, citing Section §197 of the Penal Code, and calls a witness
who testifies that the defendant was attacked with a knife by the victim. After these moves, the argument graph is as
shown in Fig. 6. The argument concluding that Section §187 is excluded, a2, is another instance of the scheme for
arguments from legal rules. The third argument applies a simplified scheme for arguments from testimony. Since
the witness testified before the court, we assume the fact this testimony was made is accepted. (This does not imply
accepting that the defendant was attacked.) This is enough to meet the defense’s burden of production for the self-
defense claim, again applying the SE proof standard. Thus, as can be seen in the Fig. 6, the counterargument succeeds
in making the murder charge no longer acceptable.
But the testimony can still be challenged by the prosecution in various ways. One would be to question the cred-
ibility of the witness, which is a critical question of the scheme for arguments from testimony, modeled here as an
exception. The prosecution in our example, however, chooses another move, by calling another witness to the stand
to testify that the defendant had enough time to run away. The state of the argument graph after this move is shown in
Fig. 7. This second application of the scheme for arguments from testimony also illustrates how rebuttals are modeled
as con arguments in Carneades. Notice, however, that this rebuttal does not (yet) succeed. The self-defense claim is
still acceptable. This is because the prosecution has the burden of persuasion in criminal cases, also for exceptions
such as the self-defense claim here. After the defendant met his burden of production for self-defense, the proof stan-
dard of the self-defense statement was changed in the model to a standard which reflects the prosecution’s burden of
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persuasion. This proof standard is satisfied if it is not the case that the complement of the best argument (BA) standard
is satisfied. Recall that the complement of the BA standard is satisfied only if the best con argument has priority over
the best pro argument. But since the arguments have not been ordered, this is not yet the case. Thus the self-defense
claim is still acceptable.
The source of the priority ordering on arguments depends on the application scenario. In a criminal proceeding,
determining the relative strength of evidence, such as witness testimony, is a task for the jury. How best to model
the ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard applicable in criminal proceedings is a question for future research. One
approach, suggested by Prakken and Sartor [35], is to apply the BA standard, but to consider one argument to have
priority over another only if it is sufficiently much stronger.
The burden of proof, whether it be the burden of production or persuasion, is assigned to some party in the dialogue,
either the proponent or respondent. These roles are relative to some statement, such as a claim or thesis. One party
may be the proponent with regard to one statement and the respondent with respect to another. The example illustrates
how this is modeled in Carneades. Whereas the prosecution is the proponent of the main claim, i.e. the murder charge,
the defense is the proponent of the legal claim that Section §187 is excluded by the self-defense rule of Section §197.
The defense is also the proponent of the factual claim that the defendant did, in fact, act in self defense. However,
due to the prosecution’s burden of persuasion in criminal cases, it has the burden of persuading the jury that the
defendant did not, in fact, act in self defense, even though it has the respondent role and the defense had the burden of
production, with respect to the self-defense issue. Had this been a civil case, the defense would have had the burden
of persuasion for the self-defense issue and the proof standard for the burden of persuasion would have been the lower
‘preponderance of the evidence’ standard. To appreciate what a difference this can make, consider the O.J. Simpson
case, where he was found not guilty of murder in the criminal proceeding but lost the later civil case against him about
the same killing. Given the arguments shown in Fig. 7, assuming the arguments pro and con self-defense have equal
priority in the context, ‘self-defense’ would be acceptable in a criminal case but not in a civil case. This illustrates
how burden of proof assignments depend on the procedural context.
In addition to selecting the appropriate premise type when developing argumentation schemes, to handle burden of
proof one must also design the argumentation protocol, at the procedural level, so that the appropriate proof standard
is assigned to statements at each stage of the proceedings. One way to do this, as we have done in this example, is
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select some standard to apply by default to all statements, and then assign some other standard to particular statements
as speech acts are performed, as required by the protocol.
The burden of persuasion typically requires a more stringent proof standard to be satisfied than the burden of
production. Moreover, the party who has the burden of persuasion need not be the same as the party who had the
burden of production. If the same party has both the burden of production and the burden of persuasion, then all that
is required is to change the proof standard to one requiring the arguments pro the statement to be stronger than the
arguments con the statement, where the proof standard defines just how much stronger the pro arguments must be.
Given the example proof standards defined in this article, any proof standard except SE would be suitable.
As illustrated in the example, however, modeling the situation where the party who has the burden of persuasion is
not the same as the party who had the burden of production is a more subtle problem, which can require some thought
when changing the proof standard after the burden of production has been met. In the example, the appropriate
standard was the negation of the complement of the best argument standard.
7. Related work
The idea of developing a computer model for managing support and justification relationships between propositions
goes back to research on truth and reason maintenance systems in Artificial Intelligence, beginning with Jon Doyle’s
Truth Maintenance System [7]. Probably the most famous system of this kind is Johan de Kleer’s Assumption-Based
Truth Maintenance System [6]. The system presented here is more like Doyle’s original system; the way it supports
defeasible reasoning using arguments with different kinds of premises is reminiscent of Doyle’s use of in and out lists
in justifications.
The idea of using different kinds of premises to help structure dialogues was also made by [2], which applied
Toulmin’s argumentation scheme [41] to annotate the conditions in the body of Horn clauses with their role in the
scheme (data, warrant, backing, rebuttal) and used these annotations to structure explanation dialogues with users.
The role of a premise in an argumentation scheme such as Toulmin’s, however, is orthogonal to the premise types
defined here. They serve different purposes and can be used together.
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The first logical models of argumentation in AI were proposed by Loui [23] and Pollock [28], followed by, among
others, Simari and Loui [39], Vreeswijk [45], Pollock [29], Dung, [8], Bondarenko et al. [4] and much subsequent
work. For an overview, see Prakken & Vreeswijk [36]. As noted in the introduction, all this work essentially takes a
relational approach, ignoring or abstracting from the dialogical context of argumentation and hardwiring proof burdens
and proof standards into the formalism. Below we briefly compare the ‘logical’ features of Carneades with this work.
As for the structure of arguments, in AI two alternative approaches are taken, depending on whether defeasibility
arises from the use of a special kind of statement or from the use of a special kind of inference rule. In the assumption-
based approach [4], the information state is divided into a theory, containing certain statements, and a set of default
assumptions, comparable to negations of our exceptions. Arguments are sets of assumptions that can be consistently
added to the theory. Conclusions can be drawn by applying some deductive consequence notion to the combination
of theory and argument. Arguments can be attacked by constructing arguments that conclude the contrary of an
assumption in the argument to be attacked. In the inference-rule approach [29,45], the inference rules are divided
into strict and defeasible inference rules and arguments are conceived of as (possibly composite) premise-conclusion
structures instantiating some inference rule. Arguments can be attacked on their defeasible inferences, for instance,
with an argument for a contradictory conclusion (Pollock’s rebuttals) or with an argument denying that a defeasible
inference rule applies in the case at hand (Pollock’s undercutters).
Carneades combines elements of both approaches. Its use of exceptions is similar to the use of assumptions, while
its idea that arguments instantiate argument schemes allows for defeasible inference rules. Like Pollock and Vreeswijk,
Carneades abstracts from particular inference rules and the logical language.12 Carneades shares with Pollock [29] the
feature that elementary arguments are combined in an argument graph. Pollock calls these inference graphs. In such a
graph, each statement occurs only once and arguments are recorded via links between the various statements, passing
through argument nodes. These nodes are similar to and links in and/or graphs. While Pollock’s graphs contain
special links between statements for attack relations, in Carneades such attack relations are expressed either as a pair
of arguments pro and con the same statement or as an argument pro an exception. A statement s and its complement
s are not unrelated in Carneades. An argument pro s is equivalent to an argument con s. And the conclusion of an
argument pro s logically contradicts the conclusion of an argument con s. Also, Carneades distinguishes the types of
premises in the graphs, to allocate the burden of proof for statements among the parties.
As for argument attack, as explained above in Section 3, Pollock’s undercutters can be represented using excep-
tions. Carneades’ distinction between pro and con arguments is essentially the same as Pollock’s notion of rebutting
arguments. Con arguments should not be confused with Verheij’s [42] arguments with dialectical negation. When in
Verheij’s Deflog system arguments for a statement and its dialectical negation can be constructed, the latter automati-
cally prevails; in Carneades, by contrast, arguments pro and con the same statement may need to be compared to see
which one has priority, depending on the applicable proof standard. Note finally that in Carneades, unlike in systems
like those of Pollock and Vreeswijk, argument premises also can be attacked. The reason is that Carneades assumes
a dialogical context in which any premise can be questioned, while in ‘relational’ approaches the premises are given
and only default assumptions can be attacked.
We next briefly compare Carneades’ argument evaluation mechanism with this prior AI work. Because of its
embedding in a dialogical context and its variable proof burdens and proof standards, such a comparison is not
straightforward. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile disregarding these additional features of Carneades and consider its
‘logical’ or ‘relational’ core.
Firstly, Theorem 1 shows that Carneades adopts the ‘unique assignment’ instead of the ‘multiple-status assignment’
approach [36]. If, for instance, a statement has one defensible pro argument and one defensible con argument and
neither argument has priority, then Carneades does not induce multiple status assignments (one in which the statement
is acceptable and one in which it is not). Instead it assigns ‘acceptable’ to the statement if it satisfies its proof standard
and it assigns ‘not acceptable’ to it otherwise.
Secondly, Carneades’ relational core sometimes exhibits so-called ‘ambiguity-blocking’ behavior. Informally, a
non-monotonic logic is called ambiguity-blocking if, when a conflict between two lines of reasoning with contradic-
12 Pollock and Vreeswijk, however, do rely on a negation operator to define argument conflict.
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tory conclusions cannot be resolved, both lines of reasoning are cut-off and neither of the conclusions can be used for
further reasoning. In such logics it may happen that other lines of reasoning remain undefeated even though one of
the cut-off lines of reasoning interferes with it and is not weaker. Consider the Carneades argument graph shown in
Fig. 8.
Suppose that the proof standard for all statements has been set to BA, that t , s and r are accepted and that neither of
the two arguments pro and con q has priority. Then q is not acceptable. However p is acceptable, since the argument
con p is not defensible. For the same reason, p would remain acceptable even if the con argument had priority over
the pro argument.
It has been argued that such an outcome is counterintuitive. For instance, Makinson and Schlechta [25] have argued
using similar examples that since the status of q is ambiguous, the argument con p, although not alive, is not fully
dead either, so it should retain its interfering force as a ‘zombie’ argument. Logics in which ‘zombie paths’ retaining
their interfering force are sometimes called ‘ambiguity propagating’.
Others, e.g. Horty [21] and Governatori et al. [18] have instead argued that ambiguity propagating is counterintu-
itive. Carneades’ procedural perspective offers another justification for this position. In full Carneades, not reduced
to its relational core, the status of q is not ambiguous, because the proof standard assigned to q clearly regulates the
acceptability of q , also when no argument has priority. By assigning the BA proof standard to q , a policy decision was
made to assign the burden of proof to the proponent of q . This burden of proof has not been met; thus q is certainly
unacceptable. The proponent of q has lost this part of the argument. On this procedural account, there is nothing un-
intuitive about the argument con p failing. Since its only premise unequivocally does not hold, one should not expect
it to be taken into consideration when evaluating the acceptability of p.
7.2. Other dialogical work on argumentation
As stated in the introduction, Carneades is meant to be an evaluative component of systems supporting persuasion
dialogues. In such dialogues, two or more participants try to resolve a difference of opinion by arguing about the
tenability of a claim, each trying to persuade the other participants to adopt its point of view. Dialogue systems
for persuasion regulate what utterances the participants can make and under which conditions they can make them,
what the effects of their utterances are on their propositional commitments, when a dialogue terminates and what the
outcome of a dialogue is. Dialogue systems for persuasion have been defined mainly in the areas of argumentation
theory, AI (& Law) and multi-agent systems. See Prakken [32] for a recent overview.
As for the outcome of dialogues, some dialogue systems only focus on whether a dialogue participant has changed
his internal, subjective beliefs in the course of a dialogue, which may not be observable for other agents. Systems of
this kind can especially be found in research on multi-agent systems, e.g. [27]. Other systems focus on inter-subjective
consensus between the dialogue participants, by looking at whether they have (publicly) committed themselves to
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committed or not committed to the main claim. This was the original approach in argumentation theory, e.g. in [46].
Finally, there are dialogue systems that besides the participants’ publicly declared standpoints also take standards
imposed from the outside into account, so that a statement can be declared acceptable or not in a certain dialogue state
even if no consensus has been reached. This is the class of systems Carneades is meant to support.
In some AI work these standards come from a (non-monotonic) logic, which is applied to the current explicit
consensus in a dialogue state. This was the approach taken in the Pleading Game [14], using conditional entailment
[12], and also by, for instance, Loui [24], who used a variant of Simari & Loui’s system [39], and Brewka [5], who
used prioritized default logic. In Prakken [31] this idea is refined. First, a purely dialogical notion of acceptability
is defined, in terms of attacking and surrendering reply relations between dialogue utterances: On the basis of these
relations it is defined whether the initial move of a dialogue is in or out. Then it is proven for a class of inference-
based argumentation systems satisfying grounded semantics that the initial move is in if and only if the main claim is
logically implied by the current consensus, assuming the participants make logically optimal moves in the dialogue.
Carneades takes Prakken’s approach to the extreme by replacing his use of a relational consequence notion with the
purely procedural notions of proof burdens and proof standards. Also, Carneades replaces Prakken’s reply relations
between dialogue utterances with its dialectical status of statements, thus fully abstracting from the speech acts of
dialogues.
7.3. Other work on modeling burden of proof
Carneades’ modeling of proof standards is inspired by Freeman & Farley’s DART system [10], an implemented
model of dialectical argumentation based on a semi-formal specification. DART models various forms of defeasible
reasoning with rules, including standard logic principles such as modus ponens and modus tollens but also nonstandard
ones, such as for abductive and a contrario reasoning. The status of arguments is defined in terms of an argument game
parameterized by a proof level for the main claim. DART does not allow for different levels of proof for premises of
the main claim or for shifts of the burden of proof to the other party and it does not take the dialogical status of
statements into account. Also, the distinction between burden of production and burden of persuasion is not explicitly
addressed.
As discussed above in Section 2, Prakken [30] adapts Prakken and Sartor’s [34] argumentation system based on
grounded semantics to let it allow for shifts of the burden of proof. The modified system assumes as input not just
an (ordered) set of rules but also an allocation of proof burdens for literals to plaintiff and defendant. The argument
game is modified to allow the two players (plaintiff and defendant) to have different dialectical roles (proponent or
opponent) for different propositions. Although Prakken [30] does not explicitly distinguish the burdens of production
and persuasion, Prakken and Sartor [35] argue that this work in fact models distribution of the burden of persuasion.
They also argue that different proof levels can be modeled by adopting different definitions of the binary defeat
relation between arguments assumed by a Dung-style approach. Our account in Section 6 of how proof burdens
can be represented in Carneades was meant to respect Prakken and Sartor’s observations while retaining the special
features of Carneades.
Finally, Prakken et al. [33] modified a persuasion dialogue game [31] to allow for debates on who has the burden
of proof. Allocations of proof burdens are expressed with a special speech act, which can be moved in reply to a
challenge of a claim. Allocations can also be challenged, which gives rise to metadialogues about who has the burden
of proof. The resulting dialogue system provides a possible dialogical context for Carneades: the burden allocations
agreed on in a dialogue could be translated into the assignment of premise types and proof standards.
8. Conclusion
Carneades is a formal, mathematical model of argument structure and evaluation which applies proof standards
to determine the acceptability of statements on an issue-by-issue basis. The main original contribution of Carneades
is its method for allocating the burden of proof to the proponent or respondent, for each premise separately, using
premise types, proof standards and the dialectical status of statements. Useful for modeling legal dialogues, the burden
of production and burden of persuasion can be handled separately, with a different responsible party and applicable
proof standard for each [35]. Following [30], our approach allows the burdens of proof to be distributed over the parties
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allows critical questions of argumentation schemes to be modeled with additional premises, using assumptions and
exceptions.
Carneades is a semantic model of argumentation, not a calculus. However, since this semantic model is formulated
in terms of computable functions, the lambda calculus may be used as a formal system. As a semantic model, the
question of the soundness or completeness of Carneades does not arise. Rather, the relevant question concerns the
validity of the semantic model. Are these semantics sufficient for providing the kind of argumentation support required
by our intended application scenarios? This question cannot be answered by purely formal means, but rather requires
experiments with realistic test cases.
Functional programming languages can be used to easily implement the model in software. Indeed, Carneades has
been fully implemented in this way, using the Scheme programming language [22]. The implementation computes the
acceptability of statements, given an argument graph and context as inputs. It can also generate argument diagrams.
The diagrams in Section 6 of this article were generated by the program.
Further work is required on modeling legal proof standards, such as ‘preponderance of the evidence’ and ‘beyond a
reasonable doubt’. Although our validation efforts thus far have been mainly in the legal domain, Carneades is intended
to be a general model of argumentation, not restricted to some application domain. Outside the legal context, we plan
to evaluate the suitability of Carneades for practical reasoning in deliberation dialogues. When completed, Carneades
will support a range of argumentation use cases, including argument construction, reconstruction, evaluation and
visualization.
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Appendix A. Proofs
Theorem 1. For every argument context C with proof standard SE, BA or DV and every argument graph G: acceptable
and holds are total functions.
Proof. The proof is with induction on the structure of argument graphs. Recall that G is finite and acyclic and every
statement occurs in it only once. We first consider the acceptability of any statement node s with no parents. A state-
ment is acceptable iff it satisfies its proof standard. Since G does not contain any argument pro s, with all three proof
standards s trivially is not acceptable. We next examine the holds function for any premise p containing s. If p = s
then if s is accepted, p clearly holds, if s is rejected, p clearly does not hold, and if s is stated or questioned, p does
not hold since s is not acceptable. If p = •s then if s is stated or accepted, p holds, if s is rejected, p does not hold
and if s is questioned, p does not hold since s is not acceptable. Finally, if p = ◦s then if s is accepted, p clearly does
not hold, if s is rejected, p clearly holds and if s is at stated or questioned, p holds since s is not acceptable.
Consider next any statement node s in G that has a parent node. Again s is acceptable iff it satisfies its proof
standard. All three proof standards depend only on the arguments pro or con s that are in G. These arguments can
be unambiguously identified since by the induction hypothesis the theorem holds for all parent statements of s and
all premises using them. Then clearly with all three proof standards s is unambiguously either acceptable or not
acceptable. We finally examine the holds function for any premise using s. Since this function depends only on the
acceptability and dialectical status of s, clearly all premises using s unambiguously either hold or do not hold. 
Theorem 2. For every argument context C with proof standards BA or DV and every argument graph G, no statement
s exists such that s and s are both acceptable.
T.F. Gordon et al. / Artificial Intelligence 171 (2007) 875–896 895Proof. Suppose s is acceptable. Then if ps(s) = BA, there exists a defensible argument A pro s such that for all
defensible arguments B con s it holds that A > B . If s satisfies BA then there exists a defensible argument B con s
such that for all defensible arguments A pro s it holds that B > A. But then > is not a strict partial order. If ps(s) = DV,
then there exists a defensible argument pro s and there is no defensible argument con s. The latter immediately implies
that s does not satisfy DV. 
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